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Note 
 
BAILEY v. UNITED STATES: DRAWING AN EXCEPTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF OFF-PREMISES DETENTIONS INCIDENT TO 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
CHRISTOPHER CHAULK

 
In Bailey v. United States,
1
 the Supreme Court of the United States 
considered whether the detention of a recent occupant of a premises subject 
to a lawful search warrant one mile away from the premises violated the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures,
2
 or was a 
permissible extension of Michigan v. Summers.
3
  The Court concluded that 
the off-premises detention did not serve the law enforcement interests 
underpinning the Court’s decision in Summers.4  The Court then articulated 
a spatial limit to Summers: officers cannot detain occupants beyond “the 
immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.”5  The majority correctly 
crafted this line to ensure that police had adequate power to detain insofar 
as the detention served the underlying interest in the “safe and efficient 
execution of the search warrant.”6  Moreover, the majority communicated a 
flexible standard for lower courts to apply and adapt to the particular 
circumstances of a given case.
7
  Justice Scalia, in concurrence, assisted the 
Court by clarifying the proper application and scope of a Summers 
detention in light of the conflicting interpretations of Summers among the 
                                                          
Copyright © 2014 by Christopher Chaulk. 

 J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author would like to thank Kari D’Ottavio, Executive Notes and Comments Editor, for all her 
guidance throughout the writing process.  He is also grateful for the writing advice he received 
from professor and mentor, David Gray.  Finally, the author greatly appreciates all the loving 
support he received throughout law school from his parents, Patrick Chaulk and Colleen Lamont, 
without which the completion of this Note would not have been possible. 
 1.  133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3.  452 U.S. 692 (1981).  In Michigan v. Summers, the Court held that a valid search warrant 
“implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a 
proper search is conducted.”  Id. at 705.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 4.  Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1041.  The three law enforcement interests are “officer safety, 
facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight.”  Id. at 1038. 
 5.  Id. at 1042. 
 6.  Id. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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federal courts of appeals.
8
  By refusing to uphold Bailey’s detention as 
reasonable, the Court confirmed that when it considers exceptions to 
traditional Fourth Amendment rules, the Court will maintain the scope of 
the exception narrowly and rigorously analyze any purported law 
enforcement interests involved to ensure the exception rests on appropriate 
justifications.
9
 
I.  THE CASE 
On July 28, 2005, police obtained a warrant to search for a handgun in 
the basement apartment of a house located at 103 Lake Drive in 
Wyandanch, New York (“the residence”).10  While conducting presearch 
surveillance of the area, two police officers observed two men appear to 
depart from the residence, leave the gated area leading to the basement 
apartment, and enter a car parked in the driveway.
11
  Both men matched the 
physical description a confidential informant had provided.
12
  The officers 
decided not to detain the men out of concerns for safety and preserving any 
potential evidence.
13
  Instead, the officers followed the vehicle and stopped 
the men about one mile from the residence.
14
 
The officers ordered the men out of the car and checked them for 
weapons.
15
  They found only keys and a wallet on the driver.
16
  Upon 
questioning the men, the officers learned the driver’s name was Chunon 
Bailey and that he lived at 103 Lake Drive.
17
  When one of the officers 
inspected Bailey’s license, however, he noticed the address was not 103 
Lake Drive in Wyandanch, New York, but rather an address in Bay Shore, 
New York.
18
  The officer recalled that their confidential informant had 
stated that the person living at 103 Lake Drive, from whom the informant 
                                                          
 8.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 10.  United States v. Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 652 F.3d 197 
(2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See id. (“[T]he detectives were concerned that, if any people who remained inside the 
residence saw that individuals leaving the residence were being stopped, they could arm 
themselves or destroy evidence prior to the search.”). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. at 377 (noting that since the search warrant was for a handgun, the officers were 
“particularly concerned” that the men might have weapons). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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had bought drugs, formerly lived in Bay Shore.
19
  The officers then 
handcuffed Bailey and the passenger.
20
  When Bailey questioned the reason 
for his arrest,
21
 the officers informed him that he was being detained 
pursuant to the execution of a search warrant at his apartment.
22
  Bailey 
then stated he was not cooperating, did not live at 103 Lake Drive, and 
anything found there did not belong to him.
23
  The officers kept Bailey’s 
keys, then called another officer to return the men to the residence.
24
  Less 
than ten minutes passed from Bailey’s initial stop to his return to the 
residence.
25
  Both men were arrested after a search of the residence revealed 
drugs and a gun.
26
 
Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York, Bailey moved to suppress the statements he made to the 
officers after being detained, as well as his key to the residence.
27
  The 
district court denied Bailey’s motion28 and upheld the officers’ actions 
under Michigan v. Summers and, alternatively, Terry v. Ohio.
29
  The district 
court first reasoned that no binding authority prohibited police from 
detaining an occupant during a valid search of the premises “when the 
occupant is found and detained outside the residence.”30  The district court 
then explained that the officers acted in a manner consistent with “[a]t least 
two” of the three law enforcement interests that justified the detention 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Summers, namely, preventing the occupant 
from fleeing and protecting the officers from harm.
31
  Ultimately, the 
district court found the officers detained Bailey “at the earliest practicable 
location that was consistent with the safety and security of the officers and 
                                                          
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 377 n.3. 
 26.  Id. at 377. 
 27.  Id. at 375–76. 
 28.  Id. at 378. 
 29.  392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (“Even if there was no 
authority for the detention under Summers, the Court finds that the stop of the defendant’s car and 
brief detention during the search were supported by reasonable suspicion and were lawful under 
Terry.”); see also infra Part II.A. 
 30.  Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
 31.  See id. (noting the officers’ testimony that “they wanted to detain Bailey as he left the 
residence pending execution of the search, but did not do so immediately because of concerns 
about the effect that such a detention would have on officer safety, as well as the potential 
destruction of evidence”). 
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the public”;32 if the officers were required to detain Bailey immediately 
outside the residence, the officers could have “jeopardize[d] the search or 
endanger[ed] [their] lives.”33  Bailey was subsequently convicted of three 
charges involving possession of drugs and a firearm.
34
 
Bailey appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit by arguing that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.
35
  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court by 
reasoning that the three law enforcement interests “at stake” in Summers 
compelled a limited intrusion of Bailey, namely, the interests in protecting 
the officers, preserving the evidence, and completing the search.
36
  The 
Second Circuit also explained that if it were to deny officers this power to 
detain, officers would be left with a “Hobson’s choice,” that is, the choice 
between detaining the individual but risking their own lives and the 
evidence, or declining to detain the individual only to obtain evidence that 
would give them sufficient cause to arrest after he had already departed.
37
  
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that “the officers acted as soon as 
reasonably practicable in detaining Bailey once he drove off the premises 
subject to search.”38  The Second Circuit explained that the holding in 
Summers contained both a physical and temporal limit: an officer can detain 
an occupant if the officer “identif[ies] [the] individual in the process of 
leaving the premises subject to search and detain[s] him as soon as 
practicable during the execution of the search.”39 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine 
whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of an occupant beyond 
the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search warrant.
40
 
                                                          
 32.  Id. at 380. 
 33.  Id. at 379–80. 
 34.  See United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 
(2013) (“Bailey was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to distribute at 
least five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 
possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i).”).  Bailey moved to vacate his conviction under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel theory, but the district court denied this motion.  United States v. Bailey, No. 06-CR-232, 
2010 WL 277069, at 
*
1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010). 
 35.  Bailey, 652 F.3d at 199.  Bailey also appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his 
conviction.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 205. 
 37.  Id. at 205–06. 
 38.  Id. at 207. 
 39.  Id. at 206. 
 40.  Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). 
 2014] BAILEY v. UNITED STATES 639 
 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons [and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause . . . .”41  Part II.A of this Note discusses the reasonableness 
inquiry that is central to the Court’s analysis of searches and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Part II.B explains how the Court has analyzed the 
reasonableness of searches incident to valid arrests.  Part II.C examines the 
Court’s reasonableness inquiry in the context of detentions incident to the 
execution of a lawful search warrant.  While many federal courts of appeals 
approached the detention cases with a focus on reasonableness, several of 
these courts also incorporated other justifications that produced confusion; 
this confusion ultimately prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
Bailey v. United States and to address whether police can detain occupants 
off the premises subject to a search warrant.
42
 
A.  The Reasonableness Inquiry 
Until the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio in 1968, it analyzed the 
reasonableness of a seizure only in cases involving an arrest; moreover, the 
Court applied a probable cause standard to determine reasonableness.
43
  In 
Terry, however, the Court altered both of these positions.  An arrest was not 
the only type of invasion that triggered the analysis of the reasonableness of 
a seizure;
44
 moreover, in cases involving seizures less invasive than arrests, 
the Court substituted the probable cause standard to determine 
reasonableness for a balancing inquiry.
45
 
The Terry Court recognized that certain types of intrusions do not fall 
under the “concept of ‘arrest,’” and thus were not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement.46  The action in Terry involved  
a stop-and-frisk of an individual by a police officer.
47
  While a stop-and-
frisk did not rise to the level of intrusiveness of an arrest, the Court 
explained that the officer’s actions “must be tested by the Fourth 
                                                          
 41.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Warrant Clause also states that the warrant must 
“particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  Id. 
 42.  See infra Part II.C.3. 
 43.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1979) (discussing the Court’s pre-
Terry Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 44.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
 45.  Id. at 19. 
 46.  See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (“An arrest is a wholly different 
kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons . . . .”). 
 47.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 6–7. 
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Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”48  The officer’s action constituted “a serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the [individual].”49 
The Court, however, refused to apply the probable cause standard to a 
stop-and-frisk because a stop-and-frisk was “a wholly different kind of 
intrusion upon individual freedom.”50  Instead, the Court assessed “the 
reasonableness [under] all [of] the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”51  Reasonableness, 
the Court noted, was the “central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”52  
The Terry Court balanced the law enforcement interests in officer safety 
and preventing crime against the petitioner’s interest in personal security.53  
In other cases where the Court has engaged in this balancing inquiry, the 
Court addressed other law enforcement concerns, such as destruction of 
evidence,
54
 and individual interests in property, privacy, and safety.
55
  The 
Court has engaged in this inquiry in cases involving, among others, 
searches incident to arrests
56
 and detentions incident to the execution of a 
search warrant.
57
 
B.  The Reasonableness Inquiry in Cases Involving Searches Incident 
to Arrests 
An overview of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases involving 
searches incident to arrests provides a useful context when considering the 
Court’s analysis in Bailey v. United States.  In Chimel v. California,58 the 
Court recognized that an officer’s interests in safety and in preserving 
                                                          
 48.  Id. at 20. 
 49.  Id. at 17. 
 50.  Id. at 26. 
 51.  Id. at 19. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 22–27; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979) (“[T]he Court [in 
Terry] balanced the limited violation of individual privacy involved against the opposing interests 
in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for 
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to 
prevent its concealment or destruction.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[W]hether a 
particular search meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”  The Court in Acton balanced the individual interest in privacy against the 
government’s interest in “[d]eterring drug use.”  Id. at 658–61. 
 56.  See infra Part II.B. 
 57.  See infra Part II.C. 
 58.  395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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evidence only justified a warrantless search of an arrestee incident to a valid 
arrest as well as of the area in the arrestee’s home within the arrestee’s 
immediate control.
59
  Relying on its reasoning in Chimel and the need for a 
workable rule, the Court in New York v. Belton
60
 held that officers could 
similarly conduct a warrantless search of the area in a vehicle within the 
arrestee’s immediate control after validly arresting the vehicle’s occupant.61  
While the Court in Thornton v. United States
62
 accepted, as it did in Belton, 
that officers needed a workable rule, and that the interests in safety and in 
preserving evidence supported a warrantless search even though the arrestee 
was no longer in his own car, the Court did not critique the relevance of the 
officer’s interests as rigorously as Justice Scalia did in his concurrence.63  In 
Arizona v. Gant,
64
 however, the Court tightened its reasonableness inquiry 
and found that the circumstances surrounding the officer’s search did not in 
fact trigger the justifications underlying the rule in Chimel.
65
 
1.  Chimel v. California 
In Chimel v. California, three police officers obtained an arrest warrant 
for Chimel’s arrest for burglarizing a coin shop.66  The officers served 
Chimel with the arrest warrant at his home, asked for his permission to 
“look around,” then, over his objection, searched his home for evidence of 
the crime.
67
  They searched the entire house and ultimately obtained many 
items, including coins and metals.
68
  Both state appellate courts rejected 
Chimel’s claim to suppress the evidence and found that police had searched 
Chimel’s house incident to a valid arrest.69 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Supreme 
Court.
70
  While the Court recognized the officers’ interests in safety and 
obtaining and preserving evidence of Chimel’s crime, the Court found these 
interests justified only a search of Chimel’s person and the area “within his 
immediate control.”71  The Court defined this term as “the area from within 
                                                          
 59.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 60.  453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 61.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 62.  541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 63.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 64.  556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 65.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
 66.  395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969). 
 67.  Id. at 753–54. 
 68.  Id. at 754. 
 69.  Id. at 754–55. 
 70.  Id. at 768. 
 71.  Id. at 763. 
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which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence.”72  The Court ultimately rejected the argument that the search of 
Chimel’s entire home was reasonable.73  This argument, the Court 
explained, could “evaporat[e]” Fourth Amendment protections of the 
individual and allow officers to defend a search based on “subjective 
view[s] regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct” 
without clear limits.
74
  Thus, the Court held that the search was 
unreasonable.
75
 
2.  New York v. Belton 
In New York v. Belton, a police officer pulled over a speeding vehicle 
and suspected that the occupants possessed marijuana.
76
  The officer then 
ordered the four occupants “out of the car, and placed them under arrest for 
the unlawful possession of mari[j]uana.”77  After he searched the arrestees, 
the officer searched the car’s passenger compartment and found a jacket 
that contained cocaine in one of the pockets.
78
  Belton, the arrestee to whom 
the jacket belonged, was later charged with criminal possession of a 
controlled substance.
79
  The trial court denied Belton’s motion to suppress 
the evidence, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that the 
warrantless search of the jacket could not be upheld as a “search incident to 
a lawful arrest” where there was no risk that any of the arrestees could gain 
access to the jacket.
80
 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of 
Appeals.
81
  The Court acknowledged that, without a “straightforward rule,” 
individuals cannot know the extent of their protection under the law nor can 
officers grasp the extent of their authority.
82
  Though the search incident to 
arrest in Chimel took place in a home, the Belton Court looked to Chimel 
because there was no “workable definition” of Chimel’s central term— 
                                                          
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 764–65. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 768. 
 76.  See 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1981) (“[T]he policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and 
had seen on the floor of the car an envelope marked ‘Supergold’ that he associated with 
marihuana.”). 
 77.  Id. at 456. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 462–63. 
 82.  Id. at 459–60. 
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“within the [arrestee’s] immediate control”—for searches of a vehicle.83  
The Belton Court recognized that the Chimel Court had taken into account 
law enforcement interests in officer safety and evidence preservation when 
making its determination that the warrantless search of the area “within [an 
arrestee’s] immediate control” was reasonable.84  The Belton Court 
ultimately found that the search of Belton’s car invoked the same law 
enforcement interests as the search in Chimel, and that a passenger 
compartment constituted an area within the arrestee’s immediate control.85  
Accordingly, the Court held that the officer’s search of Belton’s jacket, 
located in the passenger compartment of the car, amounted to a reasonable 
search incident to a lawful arrest and thus did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
86
 
3.  Thornton v. United States 
In Thornton v. United States, Thornton aroused an officer’s suspicions 
when he tried to avoid driving next to the officer’s unmarked police car.87  
Upon running a check on Thornton’s license plate number, the officer 
learned the number was issued to a different car from the one Thornton was 
driving.
88
  Thornton had already turned into a parking lot, parked, and left 
his car by the time the officer caught up to him.
89
  When the officer 
approached Thornton and questioned him about his car, he “[a]ppeared 
nervous. . . . [and] began rambling and licking his lips . . . [and] was 
sweating.”90  Thornton agreed to the officer’s request to pat him down, at 
which point the officer found drugs on him.
91
  After the officer handcuffed 
Thornton, informed him he was under arrest, and placed him in the police 
car, he searched Thornton’s car and found a handgun.92  The trial and 
appellate courts rejected Thornton’s attempt to suppress the handgun and 
                                                          
 83.  Id. at 460. 
 84.  See id. at 457 (“Such searches have long been considered valid because of the need ‘to 
remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.” (quoting Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))). 
 85.  See id. at 460 (“Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside 
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))). 
 86.  Id. at 462–63. 
 87.  541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004). 
 88.  Id. at 618. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 644 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:635 
 
distinguish Belton by arguing that he was not in his vehicle when the officer 
approached him.
93
 
The Supreme Court affirmed.
94
  The Court found that the Belton Court 
accorded no weight to the fact that the officer had met the occupants while 
they were inside the vehicle.
95
  The Court noted that an officer possesses 
“identical concerns” about safety and the preservation of evidence whether 
the suspect is inside, or next to, the vehicle.
96
  As in Belton, the Thornton 
Court affirmed the need to lay down a “clear rule” for officers to apply.97  
Thornton’s proposed rule, however, would place officers in the 
“impracticable” position of making “highly fact specific . . . ad hoc 
determinations” each time they approached an occupant.98  Thus, the Court 
held that the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its occupant is 
reasonable under Belton—“even when an officer does not make contact 
until the person arrested has left the vehicle”99—so long as the arrestee is a 
“recent occupant” of the vehicle.100 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
justifications underpinning Chimel—safety and evidentiary concerns—
could not support the search of Thornton’s vehicle for three reasons: (1) 
Thornton, handcuffed and secured in the officer’s car, could not escape to 
destroy evidence or secure a firearm;
101
 (2) the officer did not have a 
government right to secure Thornton, even if it was sensible to do so;
102
 and 
(3) the key premise in Belton was not true anymore (if it ever was), namely, 
that the passenger compartment was within the area of immediate control of 
the arrestee.
103
  Justice Scalia would have limited Belton searches to 
situations where the officer reasonably believed that “evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”104  Because the officer 
could have reasonably believed that Thornton—arrested for a drug 
                                                          
 93.  Id. at 618–19. 
 94.  Id. at 624. 
 95.  Id. at 619–20. 
 96.  Id. at 621. 
 97.  Id. at 623. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 617. 
 100.  Id. at 623–24. 
 101.  See id. at 625–27 (“The risk that a suspect handcuffed in the back of a squad car might 
escape and recover a weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk that a suspect 
handcuffed in his residence might escape and recover a weapon from the next room—a danger we 
held insufficient to justify a search in Chimel . . . .”). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 627–28. 
 104.  Id. at 632. 
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offense—had evidence of that crime in his car, Justice Scalia concluded that 
the officer’s search was reasonable.105 
4.  Arizona v. Gant 
In Arizona v. Gant, officers received an anonymous tip that drugs were 
being sold at a particular house.
106
  Upon the officers’ arrival at the house, 
Gant answered the door and told the officers the owner was not present.
107
  
The officers left and then ran a records check on Gant, upon which they 
learned of his outstanding arrest warrant for “driving with a suspended 
license.”108  Shortly after the officers returned to the house that evening, 
they recognized Gant as he pulled up to the driveway, then summoned him 
from his car and immediately arrested him.
109
  After the officers secured 
Gant in a police car, they searched his car and found cocaine and a gun.
110
  
Gant was ultimately charged with two drug offenses.
111
  The trial court 
dismissed Gant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search 
of his car,
112
 but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
search was unreasonable.
113
  The Arizona Supreme Court explained that the 
“‘justifications underlying Chimel’”—officer safety and evidence 
preservation—disappeared once the officers secured the scene, handcuffed 
Gant, and locked him in a police car.
114
 
The Supreme Court affirmed.
115
  The Court reasoned that courts of 
appeals had read Belton so broadly that officers could search a vehicle 
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even when, “in most cases,” the 
arrestee could not reach the passenger compartment.
116
  To avoid adopting 
an interpretation of Belton that would “untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception,” the Gant Court explained 
that officers could search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
                                                          
 105.  Id. 
 106.  556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 
 107.  Id. at 335–36. 
 108.  Id. at 336. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See id. (“Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his 
vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and 
because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his 
vehicle.”). 
 113.  Id. at 337. 
 114.  Id. at 337–38. 
 115.  Id. at 351. 
 116.  Id. at 342–43. 
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occupant only “when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”117  Adopting the 
argument Justice Scalia set forth in his concurrence in Thornton, the Gant 
Court explained that an officer could also search a vehicle if the officer 
reasonably believed that the search would produce evidence “‘relevant to 
the crime of arrest.’”118  The Court ultimately held that the search of Gant’s 
car was unreasonable because the officers lacked a reasonable belief that 
Gant could access his car “at the time of the search” or that they could find 
therein “evidence of the offense for which he was arrested”—driving with a 
suspended license.
119
 
Concurring, Justice Scalia argued that only one justification could 
make reasonable a search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its occupant: 
if the officer is searching for “evidence of the crime for which the arrest 
was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe 
occurred.”120  Justice Scalia reasoned that limiting the justifications for 
automobile searches incident to arrests in this manner would “tether[] the 
scope and rationale of the doctrine to the triggering event.”121 
While the Court in Chimel, Belton, and Thornton articulated a sphere 
of power for officers to conduct a warrantless search incident to a valid 
arrest, the Court most recently demonstrated in Gant that it is determined to 
scrutinize whether the circumstances surrounding the officer’s actions 
actually trigger law enforcement interests such as safety and evidence 
preservation.
122
  When these law enforcement interests are not at stake, as in 
Gant, the Court has demonstrated that it will circumscribe police power as 
is necessary to respect the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment—
reasonableness.
123
 
C.  The Reasonableness Inquiry in Cases Involving Detentions Incident 
to the Execution of a Search Warrant 
1.  Michigan v. Summers 
In Michigan v. Summers, police were about to execute a search warrant 
at a residence when they “encountered [Summers] descending the front 
                                                          
 117.  Id. at 343. 
 118.  Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 119.  Id. at 344. 
 120.  Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 121.  Id. 
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steps.”124  The officers detained Summers for the duration of the search.125  
Once the officers discovered drugs in the basement and identified Summers 
as the owner of the home, they arrested him.
126
  A search of his person 
revealed heroin in his coat pocket.
127
  Summers was “charged with 
possession of the heroin found on his person,” but the trial court granted his 
motion to suppress the evidence as “the product of an illegal search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”128  The state appellate courts affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling, but the Supreme Court reversed.129 
The Court found the detention, arrest, and search of Summers 
reasonable.
130
  First, the Court explained that certain cases, like Terry, 
demonstrate that some seizures “constitute such limited intrusions . . . and 
are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be 
made on less than probable cause.”131  Second, the Court articulated three 
law enforcement interests that justified Summers’s detention: (1) preventing 
flight, (2) protecting the officers, and (3) completing the search.
132
  The 
Court stressed that a valid search warrant, signed by a neutral magistrate, 
constitutes “an objective justification” for an officer to believe occupants of 
the premises to be searched are engaged in criminal activity.
133
  Relying on 
these factors, the Court held that police officers have “limited authority to 
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted” if 
they have “a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable 
cause.”134  The Court noted that its decision would not burden officers with 
evaluating on a case-by-case basis whether the detention of an occupant 
incident to a lawful search of a premises was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.
135
 
                                                          
 124.  452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 694. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 705. 
 131.  Id. at 699. 
 132.  Id. at 702–03. 
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 134.  Id. at 705. 
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justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.”). 
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2.  Muehler v. Mena 
In Muehler v. Mena,
136
 a Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) 
team and police officers executed a search warrant for “deadly weapons and 
other evidence of gang membership” at a house thought to be associated 
with a violent gang.
137
  Upon entering the house, the officers handcuffed at 
gunpoint Mena and three other individuals, then detained them in the 
garage for the duration of the search.
138
  The officers released the detainees 
several hours later.
139
  Mena sued the officers under the theory that “she 
was detained for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”140  A jury found the officers’ actions 
unreasonable, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
141
 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the lower courts and 
remanded.
142
  According to the Court, “Mena’s detention was, under 
Summers, plainly permissible” because “[a]n officer’s authority to detain 
incident to a search is categorical . . . .”143  The Court reasoned that two 
elements made the detention reasonable for the duration of the search: the 
existence of a search warrant, and the identification of Mena as an occupant 
of the premises subject to the search warrant at the time it was executed.
144
  
The Muehler Court explained that Summers authorizes officers to use 
“reasonable force” in detaining an occupant during a search.145  The 
officers’ use of handcuffs, however, was “undoubtedly a separate intrusion 
in addition to” Mena’s detention in the garage.146  The Court then balanced 
the extent of the intrusions against the interests of the officers at the 
scene.
147
  Although the Court recognized that Mena’s detention was “more 
intrusive” than the detention in Summers, the Court reasoned that “the 
governmental interests outweigh[ed] the marginal intrusion.”148  In 
particular, the Court stressed that the search for weapons and a “wanted 
gang member” constituted an “inherently dangerous situation[]” that 
triggered the law enforcement interest in “minimizing the risk of harm to 
                                                          
 136.  544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
 137.  Id. at 95–96. 
 138.  Id. at 96. 
 139.  See id. at 100 (noting the detainees’ “2– to 3–hour detention”). 
 140.  Id. at 96. 
 141.  Id. at 97. 
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both officers and occupants.”149  While the Muehler Court expanded the 
scope of a Summers detention, the Court endeavored to balance competing 
safety interests of the officers and the occupants in light of the intrusive 
nature of the detention.
150
 
3. Federal Courts of Appeals Consider Summers in Cases 
Involving Off-Premises Detentions
151
 
a.  Interpretations of Summers Before Muehler by Federal 
Courts of Appeals 
Before Muehler was decided in 2005, several federal courts of appeals 
applied Summers differently when confronted with an off-premises 
detention of an occupant during the execution of a valid search warrant.  In 
United States v. Cochran,
152
 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that 
Summers imposed no geographic limit on police authority to detain an 
occupant during a valid search of a premises.
153
  As officers prepared to 
execute a search warrant, they observed Cochran exit the premises by car.
154
  
They decided to detain him to facilitate the search but did not do so until he 
had “travelled a short distance” from the premises.155  In upholding 
Cochran’s eventual conviction, the Sixth Circuit explained that “Summers 
does not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity . . . 
rather, the focus is upon police performance, that is, whether the police 
detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his 
residence.”156 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit upheld an off-premises detention in United 
States v. Cavazos.
157
  Officers were surveying a premises before executing a 
search warrant when they observed Cavazos leave the premises in his 
                                                          
 149.  Id. at 100. 
 150.  Id. at 98–100. 
 151.  This Section considers federal cases since the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bailey 
to resolve the conflicting interpretations of Summers among the federal courts of appeals.  Several 
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Summers), and Fromm v. State, 624 A.2d 1296, 96 Md. App. 249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) 
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 152.  939 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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 154.  Id. at 338. 
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truck.
158
  The truck pulled up next to the officers’ vehicle and “its occupants 
peered at the officers inside.”159  When the officers pursued Cavazos, he 
turned his truck around and confronted them, as if the vehicles were in a 
“stand off.”160  The officers then exited their vehicle and detained Cavazos 
in the street, about two blocks away from the premises.
161
  Like the Sixth 
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit explained that Summers did not hinge on a spatial 
relationship between the location of the detention and the premises subject 
to the search warrant.
162
  The Fifth Circuit, however, analyzed the 
circumstances of Cavazos’s detention more rigorously by drawing the 
interest-balancing approach from the Summers Court and weighing “‘the 
character of the official intrusion and its justification.’”163 The court 
reasoned that Cavazos’s actions, particularly his surveillance of the officers 
and his aggressive driving, had triggered all three of the Summers 
governmental interests: the elimination of flight, the completion of the 
search, and the protection of the officers.
164
 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Sherrill
165
 that 
an off-premises detention was too intrusive for the court to uphold under 
Summers.
166
  While officers prepared to execute a search warrant at 
Sherrill’s residence, they observed Sherrill leave the premises in his 
vehicle.
167
  The officers pulled Sherrill’s car over “one block away from his 
home,” detained him, and returned him to the premises, where he assisted 
the officers in completing the search.
168
  The Eighth Circuit explained that 
Summers did not justify Sherrill’s detention for two reasons.169  First, the 
court reasoned that the off-premises detention was much more intrusive 
than in Summers “because Sherrill had already exited the premises.”170  In 
support of its contention, the Eighth Circuit cited a similar case in which the 
court had declined to extend Summers to the detention of an occupant “three 
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to five miles away” from the premises subject to a search warrant.171  
Second, the court reasoned that the circumstances of the detention did not 
satisfy two of the Summers interests: completing the search or preventing 
flight.
172
  Thus, the court found that the intrusiveness of the detention 
greatly outweighed the law enforcement interests.
173
 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit declined to extend Summers in United 
States v. Edwards.
174
  In Edwards, officers prepared to execute a search 
warrant at a “suspected ‘drug house.’”175  The officers watched Edwards, a 
“frequent visitor,” drive away from the premises before they executed the 
search.
176
  The officers then pulled Edwards over and detained him “at 
streetside for forty five minutes” until other officers completed the search of 
the premises.
177
  The Tenth Circuit acknowledged a seeming “parallel” with 
Summers, in that “if an ‘occupant’ on the premises may be so detained, it 
might appear that Edwards—who had just left the premises—could be 
similarly detained.”178  The court ultimately rejected this parallel, however, 
by reasoning that Edwards’s detention failed to fulfill two of the Summers 
law enforcement interests—preserving the evidence and protecting the 
officers—“in any way,” and that the third interest—preventing the 
occupant’s flight—“was far more attenuated than in Summers.”179  While 
these federal courts of appeals generally adopted the Summers Court’s 
reasonableness inquiry of analyzing “the character of the official intrusion 
                                                          
 171.  Id. (citing United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994)).  In Hogan, the 
Eighth Circuit found that: 
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and its justification,” they nevertheless varied in their application of 
Summers to off-premises detentions.
180
 
b.  Interpretations of Summers After Muehler by Federal Courts 
of Appeals 
After Muehler was decided in 2005, federal courts of appeals 
consistently justified off-premises detentions but did so by alternately 
focusing on the officers’ actions and balancing the three law enforcement 
interests raised in Summers.  In United States v. Castro-Portillo,
181
 for 
example, the Tenth Circuit recognized the significance of Muehler in 
expanding the authority underlying Summers.
182
  Officers detained and 
handcuffed Castro-Portillo two blocks from the house he exited before they 
executed a search warrant there and found drugs.
183
  In concluding that 
Castro-Portillo’s detention was permissible pursuant to the execution of the 
search warrant, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Muehler Court 
“extended” the Summers rule and provided officers with “‘categorical’” 
power to detain Castro-Portillo.
184
  Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that 
the officers acted “as soon as reasonably practicable” in detaining Castro-
Portillo.
185
  Even though the Tenth Circuit previously declined to extend 
Summers to the off-premises detention in Edwards, it explained in Castro-
Portillo that Edwards “preceded” Muehler and that Castro-Portillo’s 
detention was distinguishable.
186
 
In United States v. Montieth,
187
 the Fourth Circuit similarly recognized 
Muehler as strengthening police authority to detain incident to the 
                                                          
 180.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981).  But see United States v. Cochran, 939 
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execution of a search warrant.
188
  Officers detained Montieth nearly eight-
tenths of a mile from his home, which was subject to a search warrant, and 
acquired his consent to execute the search.
189
  Drawing upon Muehler, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that the officers’ authority to detain Montieth was 
“categorical” and did not depend on any “‘quantum of proof justifying 
detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’”190  
The Fourth Circuit found the officers’ actions were justified because the 
detention served the Summers law enforcement interests in officer safety 
and the completion of the search.
191
  The court concluded that the officers 
assumed “the most practicable means” of executing the search by not 
forcibly entering Montieth’s home where his wife and children resided and 
instead obtaining Montieth’s consent before undertaking the search.192 
Both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits interpreted Muehler as 
strengthening police power to detain an occupant incident to a search under 
Summers.
193
  Moreover, they analyzed the detention using the term first 
pronounced by the Sixth Circuit in Cochran: “whether the police detained 
defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence.”194  The  
Seventh Circuit and the Second Circuit also adopted this language from 
Cochran in upholding off-premises detentions in United States v. Bullock
195
 
and United States v. Bailey,
196
 respectively.  The Seventh, Second, and 
Fourth Circuits turned to the traditional reasonableness inquiry and 
examined the circumstances of the detention in light of the three law 
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enforcement interests articulated in Summers.
197
  Thus, while federal courts 
of appeals consistently upheld off-premises detentions after Muehler, these 
courts relied on several justifications to underpin their conclusions.  Due to 
the inconsistent use of justifications regarding reasonableness in these types 
of cases, the Supreme Court considered the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
United States v. Bailey alongside these various cases.
198
 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of 
the Second Circuit and held that the detention of an occupant nearly one 
mile from the premises subject to a valid search warrant was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.
199
  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
explained that the rule in Michigan v. Summers could not apply to 
detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises because such a 
detention did not further the three law enforcement interests articulated in 
Summers; rather, the detention would pose too severe an intrusion upon the 
individual.
200
  Tracing the Court’s exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement “prohibiting detention absent probable cause,”201 the majority 
reasoned that any exception had to adhere closely to the Fourth 
Amendment’s “purpose and rationale.”202  Thus, in determining whether to 
uphold Bailey’s detention as an extension of Summers, the Court 
acknowledged it would have to consider whether Bailey’s detention aligned 
with the reasoning underlying Summers.
203
 
As the Court set out to analyze the three law enforcement interests 
underpinning the Summers rule—officer safety, effective completion of the 
search, and preventing flight—the Court expressed concern over the extent 
of police authority to detain incident to a search as a result of Muehler v. 
Mena.
204
  Recognizing that Muehler provided police with broad power to 
detain “at the scene of the search,” the Bailey Court reasoned that police 
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would have too much authority if officers were permitted to detain 
occupants away from the scene of the search as well.
205
 
In analyzing the facts of Bailey’s detention, the Court reasoned that 
none of the law enforcement interests articulated in Summers applied “with 
the same or similar force.”206  For the first interest—officer safety—the 
Court explained that officers did not minimize a risk of harm to themselves 
by detaining Bailey because he had already left the premises before the 
execution of the search.
207
  The Court also rejected the Second Circuit’s 
concern that if officers were deprived of the authority to detain off-
premises, they would have to make a difficult choice between detaining an 
occupant on the premises, which might alert occupants inside of the 
residence of the impending search, or letting the individual get away.
208
  
According to the Court, such a concern rested on the “false premise” that 
officers were required to detain Bailey in the first place.
209
  Instead, the 
Court suggested that officers could elect not to detain immediately but 
pursue the suspect and, if appropriate, stop him later under Terry.
210
  For the 
next law enforcement interest—effective completion of the search—the 
Court explained that Bailey could not frustrate the officers’ attempt to 
complete the search because he was not at the scene when they executed the 
warrant.
211
  The Court redefined the last interest—preventing flight—as a 
branch of the second interest, which the Court already determined was not 
advanced by Bailey’s detention.212 
In analyzing the intrusion on Bailey, the Court considered Bailey’s 
detention more like “a full-fledged arrest” than the minor invasion in 
Summers because he was publicly handcuffed and transported back to his 
residence in a police car.
213
  According to the Court, “[t]hese facts illustrate 
that detention away from a premises where police are already present often 
will be more intrusive than detentions at the scene.”214  After balancing the 
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law enforcement interests at stake against the interest to Bailey, the Court 
found Bailey’s detention unreasonable.215 
The Court did not go so far as to conclude its analysis by declaring that 
any detention away from the premises to be searched is incompatible with 
Summers.
216
  Rather, it confined an officer’s power to detain occupants 
under Summers to “the immediate vicinity of the premises to be 
searched.”217  According to the Court, drawing this line ensured that a 
detention under Summers would not depart from its “underlying 
justification,” that is, “the safe and efficient execution of a search 
warrant.”218  The Court, however, declined to define its geographic 
demarcation—the immediate vicinity of the premises—because the Court 
concluded that Bailey clearly was not detained in that area.
219
  Instead, the 
Court identified several factors lower courts could use to evaluate whether 
the officers in a particular situation had conformed to this new spatial line, 
such as “the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within 
the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s 
location, and other relevant factors.”220  The Court did not address the 
application of Terry to the detention but left this question for the Second 
Circuit to consider on remand.
221
 
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s decision but wrote a 
concurring opinion to critique the Second Circuit’s “interest-balancing 
approach.”222  According to Justice Scalia, when a court considers whether 
Summers applies, it need not engage in “any balancing . . . because the 
Summers exception, within its scope, is ‘categorical.’”223  Justice Scalia 
explained that the proper inquiry was binary: did the officers detain an 
occupant, someone “within ‘the immediate vicinity of the premises to be 
searched,’” or not?224  According to Justice Scalia, Bailey—“seized a mile 
away”—was not an occupant; thus, Summers did not apply.225  Furthermore, 
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Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit’s finding that Summers 
permitted detentions if accomplished “‘as soon as practicable.’”226  Justice 
Scalia asserted that “a Summers seizure . . . ‘is not the Government’s right; 
it is an exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise 
render the [seizure] unlawful.’”227  Justice Scalia concluded by critiquing 
the Summers Court for identifying overly broad law enforcement interests 
in its decision.
228
  According to Justice Scalia, the only justification for the 
detention in Summers was “law enforcement’s interest in carrying out the 
search unimpeded by violence or other disruptions.”229 
Justice Breyer stated in dissent that the Second Circuit did not err 
because Bailey’s detention satisfied each of the law enforcement interests in 
Summers.
230
  Moreover, Justice Breyer asserted that drawing the line at “as 
soon as reasonably practicable” was more appropriate than drawing the line 
at “immediate vicinity” because the latter was too ambiguous for courts to 
apply.
231
  Consequently, Justice Breyer said, the majority’s rule did not 
“offer[] [an] easily administered bright line”; rather, it “invite[d] case-by-
case litigation” yet “offer[ed] no clear case-by-case guidance.”232  Justice 
Breyer also reasoned that when the majority crafted its rule, it should have 
taken into greater consideration the three law enforcement interests in 
Summers, which he regarded as pillars of reasonableness.
233
  Justice Breyer 
concluded that adopting the Second Circuit’s “as soon as reasonably 
practicable” standard would have more accurately addressed Fourth 
Amendment concerns.
234
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a detention 
made beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search 
warrant was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
235
  The Court 
drew a spatial line to ensure that police power to detain comported with the 
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underlying law enforcement interest in “the safe and efficient execution” of 
the search.
236
  This law enforcement interest was an appropriate, succinct 
modification of the three law enforcement interests articulated in 
Summers—protecting the officers, completing the search, and preventing 
flight.
237
  The Court also communicated its holding clearly to lower 
courts.
238
  Whereas the Summers Court did not clarify the scope of the term 
“occupant” for lower courts,239 the Bailey Court provided factors to 
incorporate in assessing the term “immediate vicinity,” as well as the 
flexibility to analyze this term on a case-by-case basis.
240
  Moreover, in his 
concurrence, Justice Scalia clarified the application and scope of Summers 
by addressing the various justifications underlining the Second Circuit’s 
decision.
241
  Like the Gant Court in the search-incident-to-arrest context, 
the Bailey Court stressed that exceptions to Fourth Amendment rules have a 
narrow scope and performed a rigorous analysis of the purported 
justifications of the officer’s actions.242  Through its holding, the Bailey 
Court struck a proper balance to ensure law enforcement interests do not 
unreasonably intrude upon individual liberty interests. 
A.  The Bailey Court Succinctly Modified the Three Law Enforcement 
Interests Articulated in Summers to Ensure That Police Power to 
Detain Occupants Within the Immediate Vicinity of the Premises to 
be Searched Is Reasonable 
The Bailey Court explained that its spatial line—immediate vicinity of 
the premises to be searched—would cover “the area in which an occupant 
poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant.”243  
The Court indicated that the “underlying justification” for its spatial line 
was not as broad as the series of law enforcement interests in Summers.
244
  
Admittedly, the interests do overlap.  For example, the Bailey Court 
recognized the Summers interests in minimizing the risk of harm to officers 
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and in completing the search by emphasizing the interest in “the safe and 
efficient execution” of the search.245  The Bailey Court explained, though, 
that “[t]he concern over flight is not because of the danger of flight itself”; 
rather, the concern over flight is only relevant insofar as it undermines “the 
integrity of the search.”246  By modifying the justifications for Summers 
detentions, the Bailey Court succeeded in tethering its holding to law 
enforcement interests that underpin an officer’s power to detain an occupant 
incident to the execution of a search warrant. 
While the dissent argued that the concern over flight “will be present 
in all Summers detentions,” the dissent did not tether its illustration to the 
facts of Bailey’s detention or the overarching concern for the search.247  
Justice Breyer explained that “any occupant departing a residence 
containing contraband will have incentive to flee once he encounters 
police.”248  Bailey, however, did not flee once he encountered the police.249  
While other suspects or detainees might act differently if confronted on the 
premises, it is unlikely Bailey’s flight could have threatened the search of 
his residence.  He was a mile away.
250
 
Justice Scalia criticized the Summers Court for justifying its decision 
on law enforcement interests that were too “expansive.”251  He construed 
the proper justifications for a Summers detention more narrowly than 
Justice Kennedy.  “The Summers exception,” Justice Scalia explained, “is 
appropriately predicated only on law enforcement’s interest in carrying out 
the search unimpeded by violence or other disruptions.”252  Like Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Scalia would not have permitted the detention of 
occupants under the theory that doing so eliminated the risk of flight of the 
occupant.
253
  Justice Scalia, however, implicitly disagreed with Justice 
Kennedy that the “efficient execution” of the search constituted a valid 
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justification for the detention.
254
  The interest in efficiency appeared to 
Justice Scalia to depart from “‘[t]he common denominator,’” which the 
Court has used to uphold “seizures based on less than probable cause” as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: a “governmental interest 
independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and 
apprehending suspects.”255  Whereas Justice Breyer in dissent endorsed the 
three law enforcement interests articulated by the Summers Court, Justice 
Scalia in concurrence sought to confine the underlying justification for a 
detention under Summers to just one interest. 
B.  The Bailey Court Communicated Clearly How Lower Courts Were 
to Interpret “Immediate Vicinity” and Provided Them Flexibility to 
Apply This Term on a Case-by-Case Basis 
The Bailey Court stated that lower courts could “consider a number of 
factors” to determine whether an officer had detained an occupant within 
the immediate vicinity of the premises subject to a search warrant.
256
  Those 
factors included, but were not limited to, the following: “the lawful limits of 
the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his 
dwelling, [and] the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location . . . .”257 
In dissent, Justice Breyer stated that “[t]he majority’s line invites case-
by-case litigation.”258  Even if Justice Breyer is correct, however, the Bailey 
Court neither needed to nor arguably should have tried to draw a bright 
spatial line.  First, the Bailey Court did not need to draw a bright line with a 
restrictive definition of “immediate vicinity” because the officers had 
detained Bailey nearly a mile from the premises, “a point beyond any 
reasonable understanding of the immediate vicinity” of his residence.259  
The Court granted certiorari to address a particular question and issued a 
holding on that particular question.
260
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Second, it is plausible the Bailey Court recognized an indomitable 
challenge in defining a term that officers and courts would inevitably 
interpret in a variety of ways.  “[T]he limitations of language,” Professor 
Albert Alschuler noted, “make extremely difficult the articulation of general 
principles that will yield justice in almost every situation that they 
address.”261  There are many types of houses, apartments, and other 
premises an officer might prepare to search; to try to explain fully the 
immediate vicinity of each would require a list of factors larger than 
anything the Bailey Court could hope to catalog.  Moreover, Fourth 
Amendment cases often hinge on “particulars” as opposed to “blanket” 
statements and rules.
262
  The Bailey Court was right to communicate to 
courts examples of relevant factors the courts could use to analyze the 
particular facts of a given case rather than confine the meaning of the term 
“immediate vicinity” to an exclusive list.  Moreover, if the Bailey Court had 
drawn a rigid spatial line, lawyers—“‘trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the 
way hounds attack foxes’”263—would likely have feasted on it. 
Third, the scope of the Bailey line does not unnecessarily constrain 
officers or lower courts.  The majority and concurrence both stressed the 
importance of confining the scope of the detention to the underlying 
justification.
264
  The Bailey rule, indeed, is an exception and ought not 
permit expansive interpretations or outcomes.
265
  The Court, in fact, 
expressed concern regarding outcomes yielding expansive police power in 
its discussion of Muehler v. Mena; it recognized Muehler as a sign of the 
“far-reaching authority the police have when the detention is made at the 
scene of the search.”266  When coupled with Justice Scalia’s critique of the 
Summers Court’s reasoning—“[w]e should not have been so 
expansive”267—the majority’s analysis of Muehler indicates that the Bailey 
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line will mark the Court’s concerted effort to maintain more narrowly the 
contours of detentions of occupants without probable cause. 
One could counter that the Bailey Court has placed courts and officers 
in a position that will hinder police in executing their duties.  As Justice 
Scalia noted, however, a search warrant does not “entitle[] the Government 
to a concomitant Summers detention.”268  A Summers detention “‘is an 
exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the 
[seizure] unlawful.’”269  Officers do not have to seize an occupant on the 
immediate vicinity of the premises,
270
 and lower courts ought not analyze 
future cases with the contrary premise in mind.  A Summers detention is not 
the only means by which to stop a suspect.
271
 
C.  Justice Scalia Correctly Clarified the Application and Scope of 
Summers When He Addressed the Interest-Balancing Approach of 
the Second Circuit 
Several courts confronted cases involving off-premises detentions 
incident to the execution of a search warrant.
272
  Because those courts did 
not read Summers to state definitively whether the power to detain extended 
beyond the premises, however, they generally conducted the traditional 
reasonableness inquiry of weighing the intrusion of the individual against 
the law enforcement interests at stake.
273
  The Second Circuit employed this 
“interest-balancing approach” in United States v. Bailey as well.274  In his 
concurrence, Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit for misinterpreting 
the application of Summers.
275
  He clarified that the Summers Court did not 
impose “‘an ad hoc determination’” on officers, nor did it require them “‘to 
evaluate . . . the quantum of proof justifying detention.’”276  Justice Scalia 
recognized that after the Muehler Court revisited Summers, the Summers 
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exception was categorical “within its scope.”277  The application of 
Summers, therefore, was a binary, not balancing, inquiry.
278
  A court only 
had to determine whether the detainee was an occupant of the premises 
subject to a search warrant.
279
  If so, then Summers applied.
280
 
One could argue that Justice Scalia obviated the question of how or if 
the Summers Court defined “occupant.”  Because lower courts, including 
the Second Circuit, did not have a workable definition to apply to cases 
involving off-premises detentions, they opted to assess the reasonableness 
of the detention by weighing competing interests.
281
  Justice Scalia provided 
an answer as to the scope of Summers by applying the majority’s 
geographic line to explain the meaning of occupant.
282
  Thus, the majority 
seemed to supply an answer to the question that had been plaguing the 
circuits—whether Summers “impose[d] upon police a duty based on 
geographic proximity.”283  The majority and Justice Scalia in concurrence 
informed officers through Bailey that the “immediate vicinity of the 
premises to be searched” marked the scope of that duty.284 
Justice Scalia also criticized the Second Circuit’s consideration of 
whether the officers had detained Bailey “as soon as practicable.”285  While 
Justice Scalia recognized the “appeal” of this inquiry, he explained that it 
was ultimately fallacious.
286
  Justice Scalia reasoned that the issuance of a 
search warrant does not per se entitle officers to detain under Summers.
287
  
Rather, a Summers detention is the exception to the rule, “‘justified by 
necessity.’”288  For Justice Scalia, that necessity arises out of the law 
enforcement interest in “carrying out the search unimpeded by violence or 
other disruptions.”289  Furthermore, the necessity arises only in the event 
that occupants are present “during the execution of a search warrant.”290 
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The Cochran Court initiated the pervasive inquiry among the federal 
courts of appeals as to whether officers had acted “as soon as 
practicable.”291  No balancing inquiry of competing interests, however, 
takes into account police performance in this manner.  The Summers Court 
certainly never recognized this term.
292
  With respect to the officers, 
reasonableness hinges on the interests at stake in the line of duty—
protecting themselves and preserving evidence.
293
  Justice Scalia 
appropriately framed a Summers detention as a limited exception justified 
by a narrow interest, not an automatic right available to well-behaved police 
officers. 
D.  The Bailey Court Adopted an Approach Consistent with the Gant 
Court—A Concerted Focus on Maintaining an Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment Narrowly and Probing the Relevance of Its 
Underlying Justifications 
The Bailey Court modified and reduced the three law enforcement 
interests at stake in Summers—minimizing the risk of harm to the officers, 
completing the search, and preventing flight—to the following: “the safe 
and efficient execution of [the] search.”294  Justice Scalia went further in his 
concurrence to emphasize that officers have an interest not in executing an 
efficient search but in “carrying out the search unimpeded by violence or 
other disruptions.”295  In both opinions, the Justices stressed that detentions 
under Summers were exceptions to be narrowly tailored.
296
  This emphasis 
is not an aberration.  By considering Bailey in light of Gant, one can 
perceive a concerted effort by the Court not to tolerate existing exceptions, 
or grant new ones, if legitimate law enforcement interests do not support 
them and the facts do not trigger those law enforcement interests. 
The Court in Belton held that officers could search “the passenger 
compartment” of a vehicle when they make “a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant” of the vehicle.297  The Belton Court looked to the justifications 
for a search incident to arrest in Chimel—safety and evidentiary concerns—
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in reaching this determination.
298
  The Gant Court, however, was concerned 
that many courts had construed the Belton rule broadly to permit searches 
“even if there [was] no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the 
vehicle at the time of the search.”299  If the arrestee could not legitimately 
gain access to the vehicle, then the justifications of officer safety and 
evidence preservation were not triggered.
300
  Consequently, the Gant Court 
restricted the scope of a Belton search to “when the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search.”301 
The Gant Court probed the competing interests and concluded that the 
broad reading of Belton undermined the individual’s privacy concerns while 
not critically protecting or serving officer safety and evidentiary 
concerns.
302
  The Court also concluded that adopting a broad reading of 
Belton would inappropriately transform an exception into “a police 
entitlement,” which the Court considered an “anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment.”303  Finally, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, would have 
eliminated the safety concern and confined the scope of reasonable searches 
under Belton to only those animated by a search for “evidence of the crime 
for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has 
probable cause to believe occurred.”304 
Similarly, the Bailey Court was concerned that upholding Bailey’s 
detention could cause the Summers exception to “diverge from its purpose 
and rationale.”305  Like the Gant Court, the Bailey Court sensed that police 
had already achieved “far-reaching authority” in detaining occupants under 
Summers and Muehler.
306
  Moreover, the Bailey Court found that the 
justifications under Summers were not triggered by the circumstances of 
Bailey’s detention.307  Thus, the Court similarly decided to impose a 
condition on officers for the detention to be reasonable—they would have 
to detain the occupant within the immediate vicinity of the premises.
308
  
Justice Scalia agreed with the condition the majority imposed, but would 
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have circumscribed the holding further.
309
  Like the Gant Court, Justice 
Scalia stressed in Bailey that officers were not entitled to the authority in 
question and only could use it in very narrow circumstances.
310
 
One may ask how the Court will approach the next case involving a 
detention incident to the execution of a search warrant.  Justice Breyer 
argued in dissent that the Bailey Court’s line of reasoning could promote 
uncertainty among the lower courts,
311
 uncertainty that could likely trigger a 
case before the Court on the meaning of “immediate vicinity.”  Or perhaps 
the Court will first face another controversy over the manner or duration of 
a detention under Summers and Muehler.  However Bailey arises in a future 
case before the Supreme Court, the Bailey opinion provides valuable insight 
into how the Court treats Fourth Amendment issues, rules, and exceptions.  
The Court has demonstrated that it is willing to chisel away at the 
justifications underlying its exceptions, is attentive in appraising the facts of 
the case alongside the purported justifications, and is insistent that officers 
not undertake their roles with the assumption that a search or a detention is 
a government right.  In Bailey, the Court was careful to maintain control of 
an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment rules. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Bailey v. United States, the Court concluded that a detention under 
Summers could not occur beyond “the immediate vicinity of the premises to 
be searched” without violating the Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness.
312
 This spatial line nevertheless supplies police with 
adequate power to detain, power underpinned by a more appropriate 
justification than that in Summers.
313
  The Court also communicated this 
line to lower courts with enough flexibility to ensure that it would not 
collapse under the particulars of a given case.
314
  Justice Scalia assisted 
lower courts by articulating the proper application and scope of Summers to 
ensure courts do not permit a theory that officers possess a government 
right to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant; rather, this 
power to detain is an exceptional grant of narrow authority.
315
  The Court in 
Bailey, as it had in Gant, focused on ensuring that an exception granting 
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police power was narrow and justified by relevant law enforcement 
interests.
316
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